Alaska by Bunkers, Traci N
Texas A&M Journal of Property 
Law 
Volume 6 
Number 3 Survey on Oil & Gas Article 2 
12-1-2020 
Alaska 
Traci N. Bunkers 
tbunkers@guessrudd.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/journal-of-property-law 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
George R. Lyle, Adam D. Harki, & Traci N. Bunkers, Alaska, 6 Tex. A&M J. Prop. L. 5 (2020). 
This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Texas A&M Journal of Property Law by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law 
Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
ALASKA 
George R. Lyle, Adam D. Harki, and Traci N. Bunkers1 
I. LEGISLATION
The First Regular Session of the thirty-first Alaska 
Legislature began on January 15, 2019, and ended on May 15, 2019.  
A First Special Session was held from May 16, 2019, through June 
13, 2019, with a Second Special Session following from July 8, 
2019, through August 6, 2019.   
The 2019 legislative session resulted in virtually no oil and 
gas legislation being passed, as the Alaska Legislature focused 
primarily on legislation regarding the State budget and the funding of 
the Permanent Fund Dividend.  Despite the uncharacteristic lack of 
oil and gas legislation, the Legislature addressed the prevalent issue 
of oil and gas leasing in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
(“ANWR”) through the passage of Senate Joint Resolution No. 7.   
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V6.I3.2 
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A. Senate Joint Resolution No. 7 (“SJR 7”) 
 
In passing SJR 7, the Legislature resolved to request that the 
United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”) implement an oil and gas leasing program in the coastal plain 
of the ANWR.   
The Resolution provides that 16 U.S.C. 3143 (sec. 1003 of the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”)) and 
16 U.S.C. 3142 (sec. 1002 of ANILCA) authorize both oil and gas 
development and production and nondrilling exploratory activity 
within the coastal plain of the ANWR.2  In passing the SJR 7, the 
Legislature noted that the coastal plain of ANWR contains an 
estimated 7.687 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 7 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas,3 which could generate over $104 billion in 
government revenue from petroleum development.4  SJR 7 further 
notes that exploration, development, and production of ANWR is 
predicted to generate 1,430 direct and 6,350 indirect jobs annually, 
with 2,480 direct and 10,100 indirect jobs at peak employment.5   
The Resolution closes with the Legislature’s request that the 
BLM take into consideration “the long history of safe and responsible 
oil and gas development on Alaska’s North Slope, the enormous 
benefits development of oil and gas resources in the coastal plain of 
the ANWR would bring to the state and the nation, the advances in 
oilfield technology that continue to shrink the impact area of oil and 
gas activities, and the support of residents from the North Slope 
Borough and across the North Slope of Alaska for oil and gas 
development in a portion of the coastal plain.”6   
 
II. CASE LAW   
 
A. Cases of the Supreme Court of Alaska 
 
i. All American Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC7 
 
 2. SJR 7, p.1. 
 3. Id., p. 2. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id., p. 3. 
 7. All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 
2019). 
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In 1910, the United States Congress passed Alaska’s first 
mineral dump lien statute, which grants laborers a lien against a 
“dump or mass” of hard-rock minerals for their work creating the 
dump.  Alaska’s territorial legislature amended the dump lien statute 
in 1933 to include oil and gas development.  This amendment has 
created the framework for technological advances in Alaska’s oil and 
gas industries that has remained largely unchanged. 
In All American Oilfield LLC, the Alaska Supreme Court 
accepted certified questions from both the United States District 
Court and the United States Bankruptcy Court8 regarding the breadth 
of the mineral dump lien statute as it applies to natural gas 
development: 
1. Can a “dump lien” under Alaska Statute (“AS”) 
34.35.125 et seq. apply to gas stored in its natural 
reservoir?; 
2. Is a mineral “dump” created under AS 34.35.140 and 
AS 34.35.170(a)(1) each time that natural gas is 
released from the natural reservoir in which the gas 
was formed and transported through a pipeline to the 
point of sale? 
3. Must a dump lien claimant under AS 34.35.140 prove, 
in order to have a valid dump lien, that the produced 
gas was, in whole or in part, the product of her labor?9 
 
a) Un-Extracted Natural Gas Remaining In Its Natural Reservoir 
Cannot Constitute A “Dump” 
 
With respect to the first question, the Supreme Court held 
that the statutory definition of “dump or mass” reflects that a mineral 
dump lien may extend only to gas extracted from its natural 
reservoir.10  Under the relevant statutory framework, there must be a 
 
 8. The certified questions stem from an adversary proceeding filed by All 
American in case of In re Cook Inlet Energy LLC, 2017 WL 1082217 (Bankr. D. 
Alaska Mar. 21, 2017), in which All American asked the bankruptcy court to 
determine the validity and priority of its secured claims against Cook Inlet, as well 
as a district court case in which the trustee for Cook Inlet’s liquidation trust sued 
Carol Inman, d/b/a Starichkof Enterprises for payments that Cook Inlet made to her 
prior to filing for bankruptcy.  See All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 770. 
 9. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 771. 
 10. Id., at 773. 
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“dump” to which the lien can attach for a claimant to obtain a dump 
lien.11   
The Court found that the existence of a dump is a condition 
precedent to obtaining a dump lien.  Under the statute’s plain 
meaning, un-extracted gas cannot constitute a dump because it was 
never “extracted, hoisted, and raised” as the statutory definition 
requires.12   
The Supreme Court further found that neither the legislative 
history nor the relevant case law interpreting the dump lien statute 
extends the statutory definition of “dump” to include any un-
extracted gas remaining in its natural reservoir.13  Further, affording 
the statute its plain meaning does not lead to glaringly absurd 
results.14 
 
b) Natural Gas in a Pipeline May Constitute a “Dump” 
 
In ruling on the second certified question, the Supreme Court 
found that, because gas in a pipeline has been “extracted, hoisted, 
and raised” and is “in mass,” it may constitute a dump if it is located 
“adjacent” to the mine or mining claim.  However, whether gas is 
adjacent to a mine or mining claim must be decided on a case-by-
case basis.15   
The Court rejected Cook Inlet’s arguments that gas in a 
pipeline cannot qualify as a “dump.”  Instead, the Court determined 
that gas in a pipeline has been “extracted, hoisted, and raised” 
 
 11. See AS 34.35.140(a). 
 12. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 773.  See AS 34.35.170(a)(1).  
 13. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 774, examining Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 
422, (creating miner’s labor lien in Alaska territory); 45 Cong. Rec. 4,905 (1910); 
Donaldson v. Henning, 4 Alaska 642 (D. Alaska 1913); Nordstrom v. Sivertsen-
Johnsen Mining & Dredging Co., 5 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1914); Ch. 79, SLA 1913; 
Ch. 13, SLA 1915; Ch. 113, SLA 1933. 
 14. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 776.  In ruling “no” to the first certified 
question, the Supreme Court held that All American could not qualify for a dump 
lien under AS 34.35.140 because the gas for which All American drilled wells was 
not “extracted, hoisted, and raised” from the mine. However, the Court noted that 
All American may still obtain a non-preferred mine lien under AS 34.35.125, as the 
definition of “mine” or “mining claim” includes “all valuable mineral deposits, 
including coal, oil, gas, or other fluid, and all loads, veins, or rock in place containing 
minerals.” See AS 34.35.170(a)(3). 
 15. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 777. 
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because it has been “extracted from the soil and brought to the 
surface,” and, thus, ceases to be a mineral deposit.16 
Alaska Statute 34.35.170(a)(1) also requires gas to be “in 
mass” to constitute a dump.  The statute provides that a dump is “in 
mass . . . whether it is deposited in dumps or piles, or placed in 
hoppers, tanks, or reservoirs, or in sluice boxes or bunkers or other 
receptacles.”17 Adopting the interpretation that the “whether” clause 
of the statute limits the ways that a dump can be “in mass” to the 
enumerated examples,18 the Court noted that the only way for natural 
gas to be “in mass” would be for it either to be “deposited in dumps 
or piles” or “placed in hoppers, tanks, or reservoirs, or in sluice 
boxes or bunkers or other receptacles.”19  However, because gas 
cannot be deposited into a dump or pile, the determination rests on 
whether natural gas pumped out of its natural reservoir into a 
pipeline on its way to another destination is “placed” into a 
“receptacle” for the statute’s purposes.20   
The Court examined the definitions of receptacle, tank, and 
hopper, and concluded that pipelines constitute “receptacles.”  Even 
though the primary purpose of a pipeline is transport, the statute’s 
inclusion of “sluice box” indicates that a “receptacle” under the 
statute need not only or primarily hold its contents.21  Thus, “[i]n the 
process of conveying a gas, pipelines do hold or contain it for a brief 
period of time, as a receptacle would.”22  However, whether gas in a 
pipeline is “adjacent” to a mine or mining claim, in order to 
constitute a dump, requires a “fact-specific inquiry to determine if 
 
 16. Id., at 778, citing 38 Am. Jur. 2d Gas and Oil § 4 (2017) (“Gas and oil when 
unsevered are a part of the land and after gas and oil are extracted from the soil and 
brought to the surface, they are deemed personal property.” (Internal citations 
omitted)); see Cont’l Res. of Ill., Inc. v. Ill. Methane, LLC, 847 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ill. 
App. 2006) (“Oil and gas in place are minerals, but because of their fugacious 
qualities, they are incapable of ownership distinct from the soil. . . . Oil and gas are 
incapable of ownership until actually found and produced.”). 
 17. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 778, citing AS 34.35.170(a)(1). 
 18. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 778, citing Studdert v. Tanana Valley Gold 
Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 267, 271 (D. Alaska 1931) (“Clearly, in my judgment, the 
Legislature intended, by the use of this language, to refer only to sands, earth, ore, 
rock, and minerals which were either deposited in dumps or piles, placed in hoppers 
or tanks or in sluice boxes or bunkers, or other receptacles, located in the same 
place.”)  
 19. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 778. 
 20. Id. 
 21. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 779. 
 22. Id. 
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the off-mine portions are close enough to be considered ‘adjacent’ to 
the mine.”23 
 
c) Produced Gas Must be the Product of the Lienor’s Labor 
 
The Supreme Court answered the final question, whether 
dump lien claimants must prove that produced gas is the product of 
their labor, in the affirmative.  Unlike AS 34.25.125, AS 
34.35.140(a) plainly requires that lien claimants make this showing, 
providing that the dump lien is “to secure the amount due the laborer 
in the production of the minerals.”24  The Supreme Court found that 
a laborer may claim and enforce a dump lien by performing any of 
the kinds of work mentioned in the dump and mine lien statutes;25 
however, whether a particular claimant’s labor meets these 
requirements is case-specific and must be left to the trier of fact.26 
ii. Kenai Landing, Inc. v. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, 
LLC27 
 
In Kenai Landing, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed the 
Superior Court’s ruling regarding compensation for producible 
native gas remaining in a reservoir at the time of a taking, as well as 
its valuation of gas storage rights. 
 
 
 23. Id. at 780.  The Supreme Court made no rulings with respect to whether the 
gas in the pipelines was “adjacent” with respect to All American’s and Inman’s 
claims, as neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court made findings about the 
exact location and size of the pipelines at issue in those cases.  Id. 
 24. AS 34.35.140(a). 
 25. See AS 34.35.140(a) (a claimant may be entitled to a dump lien by 
performing “any of the kinds of work mentioned in AS 34.35.125” or “any other 
kind of work in the production, piling up, or storing of a dump or mass of mineral.”)  
See also AS 34.35.12 (identifying the following work entitling a claimant to a mine 
lien: opening up, developing, sinking, drilling, drifting, stoping, mucking, stripping, 
shoveling, mining, hoisting, firing, cooking, teaming, or perform[ing] any other 
class or kind of work necessary or convenient to the development, operation, 
working, or mining of the claim or well; . . . perform[ing] work tending to or 
assisting in the developing, extraction, separation, or reduction to a commercial 
value of the minerals; . . . perform[ing] work on a water right, ditch, flume, pipe line, 
tramway, tram, road, or trail, used in connection with the opening up, or to facilitate 
the opening up, operation, or development of the claim or well, or the extraction of 
the minerals.) 
 26. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 781. 
 27. 441 P.3d 954 (Alaska 2019). 




The appellee, Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC 
(“CINGSA”), is a private company that was building a natural gas 
facility for storage of natural gas collected from various sites.  The 
gas is stored by injecting it into a rock formation, known as the 
Sterling C Reservoir.28  To facilitate efficient gas extraction, there 
must be a minimum amount of pressurization, which requires a 
minimum amount of gas in storage, also known as “base” or 
“cushion” gas.29  Within the Sterling C Reservoir, some of the base 
gas consisted of gas left in the Reservoir when it was acquired by 
CINGSA.30 
The appellant, Kenai Landing, Inc., owns a parcel of land 
overlying the Sterling C Reservoir that was acquired subject to the 
Wards Cove Lease (the “Lease”).  The Lease is committed to the 
Cannery Loop Unit and exists so long as gas is being produced 
anywhere in the unit.31  
To operate its storage facility, CINGSA filed a condemnation 
action to obtain necessary property rights.  At the time of filing the 
action, the royalty rights under the Lease were held by Wards Cove, 
and the production rights were held by Marathon Alaska Production 
Company.32 CINGSA negotiated separate agreements with both 
Wards Cove and Marathon to obtain their rights as lessor and lessee, 
respectively, under the Lease.  The Department of Natural Resources 
subsequently agreed to sever the Sterling C Reservoir from the 
Cannery Loop Unit so that it could be used for storage purposes.33  
After CINGSA commenced its condemnation proceeding, it 
discovered a “pocket of gas,” which ultimately increased the amount 
of native gas in the Reservoir, including the gas underneath Kenai 
Landing’s property.34  
 
b) Procedural History 
 
 28. Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 957. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Gas left in the ground is known as “native gas.” 
 31. Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 957-58. 
 32. Id. at 958. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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CINGSA subsequently filed a complaint against Kenai 
Landing to condemn certain rights to the Sterling C Reservoir that it 
had not already acquired, including: (1) an easement for gas storage, 
including any underground formations in the Reservoir, as well as an 
adjoining geological zone for use as a “buffer;” and (2) an easement 
in the mineral interests, allowing CINGSA the use of “all gas, oil, or 
other minerals . . . located within the Sterling C Pool and the 
correlative buffer geological formation, including the use of native 
gas as base gas for the storage facility.”35   
CINGSA subsequently moved for partial summary judgment 
on the grounds that Kenai Landing had no right to compensation for 
any of the native gas in the Reservoir because CINGSA owned this 
gas as assignee of the Lease.  Finding that the Lease was still in 
effect, the superior court found that Kenai Landing was not entitled 
to compensation for native gas and granted summary judgment in 
CINGSA’s favor.36   
Because the parties agreed that Kenai Landing was entitled to 
compensation for the use of its property for underground gas storage, 
the superior court held a hearing to value the storage rights and 
corresponding valuation.  Kenai Landing disputed the superior 
court’s valuation and subsequently filed an appeal, in which it: (1) 
challenged the superior court’s refusal to compensate it for 
CINGSA’s use of native gas; (2) argued that it was entitled to 
compensation for the “new” gas discovered by CINGSA after the 
taking; and (3) disputed the valuation of its storage rights.37 
 
c) Kenai Landing Was Not Entitled to Compensation for Native Gas 
 
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that Kenai 
Landing was owed no compensation for the producible native gas 
remaining in the Sterling C Reservoir at the time of the taking.  
Analyzing the principles of just compensation, the Court determined 
that Kenai Landing lost nothing by virtue of CINGSA’s 
condemnation of an easement.38  Specifically, because CINGSA 
holds both production rights and a royalty interest by virtue of its 
assignment under the Wards Cove Lease, Kenai Landing does not 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 958. 
 37. Id. at 959. 
 38. Id. at 960. 
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have the right to produce or receive royalties so long as the Lease 
exists.39  CINGSA, “by condemning the easement, gained the use of 
the native gas as base gas, but Kenai Landing did not lose anything it 
already had.”40   
The Supreme Court characterized Kenai Landing’s right to 
the gas as reversionary because it had no right to extract native gas, 
block its production, or use the native gas for any purpose.  As such, 
Kenai Landing was not entitled to compensation for any producible 
native gas that remained in the Reservoir at the time of the taking.41 
 
d) Kenai Landing Was Not Entitled to Compensation for New Gas 
 
Kenai Landing’s second argument, that it was entitled to 
compensation for newly discovered gas, was rendered moot by the 
Supreme Court’s ruling that Kenai Landing was not entitled to 
compensation for native gas.42   
The Court also rejected Kenai Landing’s argument against 
the lower court’s use of the “scope of the project” rule, “which holds 
that enhancements to the condemned property’s value, arising after it 
becomes likely that the property will be condemned, do not benefit 
the condemnee.”43  The Court noted that the new gas was not present 
until CINGSA accidentally discovered it while working on the 
project, and, the scope of the project rule precludes compensation for 
the new gas because it was not part of Kenai Landing’s property 
when condemnation proceedings began.44 
 
e) The Superior Court Did Not Err in Valuing Kenai Landing’s Pore 
Space Rights 
 
Kenai Landing’s remaining arguments on appeal involved the 
superior court’s valuation of its storage rights.  Kenai Landing 
argued that the superior court undervalued these rights by failing to 
consider the “highest and best use” of the storage space.45  Instead, 
 
 39. Id. at 960-61. 
 40. Id. at 961. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 962, citing City of Valdez v. 18.99 Acres, 686 P.2d 682, 689 (Alaska 
1984). 
 44. Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 962. 
 45. Id. 
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Kenai Landing sought the application of the “fullest extent rule,” 
“which presumes that the appropriator will exercise [the rights 
acquired] and use and enjoy the property taken to the full extent.”46  
However, the Supreme Court found that application of the fullest 
extent rule undermines Alaska law on just compensation.   
The Court looked to Martens v. State,47 where the Supreme 
Court previously held that, when there is “a reasonable probability of 
a change in the near future in the zoning ordinance or other 
restriction, then the effect of such probability upon the minds of 
purchasers generally may be taken into consideration in fixing 
present market value.”48  Because the evidence in the record 
established that no change in the storage capacity was “reasonably 
probable” in the near future, the lower court properly declined to 
apply the fullest extent rule as urged by Kenai Landing.49 
Kenai Landing also argued that the lower court erred by 
including the buffer area in valuing the condemned property.  
Specifically, Kenai Landing argued that by assigning equal value to 
the buffer area, the superior court diluted the value assigned to the 
actual pore space and “punishes [Kenai Landing] based on 
CINGSA’s arbitrary determination as to how much non-pore buffer 
area to include within its proposed ‘storage boundary.’”50  However, 
the Supreme Court found that the superior court included the buffer 
area in its valuation as a matter of industry practice after three of 
CINGSA’s experts testified that a buffer zone is “required for 
prudent operation” of a gas storage field.51  The experts also testified 
that a buffer zone is “important to the integrity of a gas field,” and 
that “in the industry no difference is made in the leasing rates 
applicable to surface land over the reservoir area versus land located 
over the buffer area.”52  The Supreme Court likewise upheld the 
lower court’s reliance on one of CINGSA’s expert’s with respect to 
the actual value of the storage space.53 
 
 
 46. Id. at 963, citing Coos Bay Logging Co. v. Barclay, 159 Ore. 272, 79 P.2d 
672, 677 (Or. 1938). 
 47. 554 P.2d 407, 409 (Alaska 1976). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 963-64. 
 50. Id. at 964. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 965. 
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B. Cases of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska 
 
i. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump54 
In League of Conservation Voters, the United States Court for 
the District of Alaska considered the scope of a President’s authority 
under Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(“OCSLA”), finding that Section 12(a) does not endow the President 
with the authority to revoke withdrawals of unleased land from the 
Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”).55   
a) Background 
 
OCSLA was enacted in 1953 with two purposes: (1) “[t]o 
provide for the jurisdiction of the United States over” OCS lands;56 
and (2) “to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease such lands 
for certain purposes.”57  Section 12(a) of the OCSLA provides: “The 
President of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw 
from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental 
Shelf.”58   
Plaintiffs59 sued the federal defendants60 for an alleged 
violation of the Constitution’s Property Clause, as well as an alleged 
violation of the statutory authority endowed by Section 12(a) of 
OCSLA, after President Trump issued Executive Order 13795,61 
intended to revoke three memoranda and one executive order issued 
by President Obama in 2015 and 2016 withdrawing certain areas of 
 
 54. 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D. Alaska 2019).   
 55. League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1030-1031. 
 56. Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462, 462 (1953). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 12(a), 67 Stat. 462, 469 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a)). 
 59. Plaintiffs included the League of Conservation Voters, Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Sierra Club, Alaska Wilderness League, Defenders of Wildlife, 
Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Resisting Environmental Destruction on 
Indigenous Lands, Center for Biological Diversity, Greenpeace, Inc., and The 
Wilderness Society. 
 60. The federal defendants included Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as 
President of the United States, Ryan Zinke, in his official capacity as Secretary of 
the Interior, Wilbur Ross in his official capacity as Secretary of Commerce, 
American Petroleum Institute, Intervenor Defendant, and State of Alaska, Intervenor 
Defendant.  Guess and Rudd, P.C. represented Intervenor Defendant, American 
Petroleum Institute. 
    61.  See Exec. Order 13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815, §§ 4(c), 5 (Apr. 28, 2017).  
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the Outer Continental Shelf from leasing.62 
 
b) The Statutory Text of Section 12(a) 
 
On the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the Court 
examined both the plain text of Section 12(a) and the context in 
which it was enacted.63  In examining the plain language of Section 
12(a), the Court noted that, while the text of Section 12(a) expressly 
grants the President the authority to withdraw unleased lands from 
the OCS, it does not expressly grant to the President the authority to 
revoke prior withdrawals.  
However, the statute’s inclusion of the phrase “from time to 
time” created ambiguity.64  Specifically, the phrase could be 
interpreted in two ways: (1) “to make clear the President’s authority 
to make withdrawals at any time and for discrete periods of time, as 
well as make withdrawals that extend indefinitely into the future 
unless and until revoked by Congress;” or (2) “to accord to each 
President the authority to revoke or modify any prior withdrawal.”65 
In light of the ambiguity created by the language of Section 12(a), 
the Court examined context of Section 12(a) in order to discern 
Congress’s intent.66  
 
c) The Context of Section 12(a) 
 
In considering the context of Section 12(a), the Court 
analyzed the structure of OCSLA, OCLSA’s legislative history and 
prior statutes, the purposes of OCSLA, and OCSLA’s subsequent 
legislative history.   
 
    62.  See Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States 
Outer Continental Shelf Offshore Alaska From Leasing Disposition, 
DCPD201500059 (Jan. 27, 2015); Exec. Order 13754, 81 Fed. Reg. 90669, § 3 
(Dec. 9, 2016); Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Portions of the United 
States Arctic Outer Continental Shelf From Mineral Leasing, DCPD201600860 
(Dec. 20, 2016); Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas off the Atlantic 
Coast on the Outer Continental Shelf From Mineral Leasing, DCPD201600861 
(Dec. 20, 2016).  
   63.  League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1018. 
   64.  Id. at 1024. 
   65.  Id. 
   66.  Id. 
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1. The Structure of OCSLA 
With respect to structure, the Court compared Section 12(a) 
with Section 8.  Section 8 of OCSLA, titled “Leasing of Outer 
Continental Shelf,” authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease 
OCS lands “[i]n order to meet the urgent need for further exploration 
and development of the oil and gas deposits” beneath the OCS.67  
Section 12 of the Act, as enacted in 1953, was titled “Reservations.”  
Most of the provisions of that section address restrictions on the 
private use of OCS lands, and no subsection expands private sector 
use of these lands.68  Contrasting the two sections, the Court found 
that Section 8 was intended to promote leasing, while Section 12(a) 
is “entirely protective,”69 stating, “Interpreting OCSLA to promote 
expeditious leasing in Section 8, but according to the President 
authority to prohibit leasing in specified areas in Section 12(a), gives 
effect to all of OCSLA’s provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”70 Accordingly, 
OCSLA’s structure promotes the view that Section 12(a) did not 
grant revocation authority to the President.”71 
2. The Legislative History of OCSLA 
In evaluating the legislative history of Section 12(a), the 
Court rejected the federal defendants’ assertion that, because the 
President has the authority to revoke withdrawals on uplands, 
Section 12(a) similarly vests the President with the authority to 
revoke withdrawals of unleased lands on the OCS.  The defendants 
relied on Senate Report No. 83-4, in which the Committee on 
Interior and Consular Affairs stated that “it was vesting withdrawal 
authority ‘comparable to that which is vested in [the President] with 
respect to federally owned lands on the uplands.’”72 The Court 
 
   67.  Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 8(a), 67 Stat. 462, 468 (1953) (current version at 43 
U.S.C. § 1337). 
   68.  Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 12(a)-(f), 67 Stat. 462, 469-70 (1953) (codified at 43 
U.S.C. § 1341). 
   69.  League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1025. 
   70.  Id. at 1026 (internal citations omitted). 
   71.  Id. 
   72.  League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1025, citing S. Rep. No. 
83-411, at 26 (1953). 
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ultimately held that “Congress’s silence in Section 12(a) as to 
according the President revocation authority was likely purposeful; 
had Congress intended to grant the President revocation authority, it 
could have done so explicitly, as it had previously done in several 
(but not all) of its previously enacted uplands laws.73  The Court also 
held that Attorney General opinions further establish that Congress 
intended to authorize the President only to withdraw OCS lands from 
leasing in Section 12(a).74  The Court further rejected the argument 
that the deletion of a provision limiting withdrawal authority from a 
prior version of Section 12(a) signaled authority to revoke 
withdrawals, asserting that the deletion afforded the President more 
discretion in making withdrawals but did not endow the President 
with the authority to revoke any of those withdrawals.75 
3. The Purposes of OCSLA 
Turning to the purposes of OCSLA, the Court focused on the 
second purpose of OCSLA—”to authorize the Secretary of the 
Interior to lease [OCS] lands for certain purposes.”76  The Court 
noted that, while Congress “clearly sought more leasing,” it did not 
seek “unbridled leasing,” given that OCSLA was to “be construed in 
such manner that the character as high seas of the waters above the 
outer Continental Shelf and the right to navigation and fishing 
therein shall not be affected.”77  The Court also noted that Congress’s 
inclusion of Section 12—”Reservations”—was also intended to limit 
leasing activity:  
The fact that Congress expressly granted the 
President the authority to withdraw OCS lands 
from leasing, but did not expressly grant the 
President the authority to revoke such 
withdrawals, is not inconsistent with the second 
purpose of OCSLA as enacted in 1953, 
particularly as Congress itself retained the 
 
   73.  Id. at 1027. 
   74.  Id. 
   75.  Id. at 1028. 
   76.  Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462, 462 (1953). 
   77.  League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1028, citing Pub. L. No. 
83-212, Section 3(b), 67 Stat. 462, 462 (1953). 
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authority to revoke prior presidential 
withdrawals pursuant to the Property Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.78  
The Court rejected the federal defendants’ contention such an 
interpretation would allow a President to permanently withdraw the 
entire OCS from exploration and development, absent intervention 
from Congress.  Looking to prior Attorney General opinions, the 
Court found that, “Congress has previously authorized the President 
to tie future Presidents’ hands.”79 While Section 12(a) technically 
allows a President to permanently withdraw all unleased lands on the 
OCS, the Court noted that Congress could reverse such an action by 
either revoking the withdrawal itself or amending Section 12(a) to 
expressly allow a President to revoke a prior presidential 
withdrawal.80 
4. The Subsequent History of OCSLA 
Finally, in considering OCSLA’s subsequent history, the 
Court held that Congress’s decisions not to challenge prior 
revocations did not meet the “high bar required to constitute 
acquiescence.”81 In addition, Congress’s lack of action regarding 
Section 12(a) did not allow the Court to draw any appropriate 
inference that would “override” the Court’s interpretation of Section 
12(a) based on the section’s language and legislative history prior to 
its enactment.82 
Based on the context in which Section 12(a) was enacted, the 
Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, declaring 
the revocation of Executive Order 13795 invalid and unlawful and 
vacating Section 5 of the Order.83  The defendants have since filed 
 
   78.  League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1029. 
   79.  Id. at 1029. 
   80.  Id. 
   81.  Id. at 1030, citing United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469-71 
(1915) (holding that presidential withdrawal of public lands was lawful because 
Congress had “uniformly and repeatedly acquiesced” to the President’s creation of 
roughly 250 reservations).  
   82.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
   83.  Id. at 1030-31. 
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notices of appeal with respect to the Court’s ruling.84 
 
 
   84.  See Notice of Appeal by Wilbur Ross, Donald J. Trump, Ryan Zinke, 
League of Conservation Voters et al v. Trump et al, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG (D. 
Alaska May 28, 2019); Notice of Appeal by American Petroleum Institute, League 
of Conservation Voters et al v. Trump et al, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG (D. Alaska 
May 28, 2019); Notice of Appeal by State of Alaska, League of Conservation 
Voters et al v. Trump et al, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG (D. Alaska May 28, 2019). 
